



Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

Bill John

This is the DDI
proposal in response to
SSCI intent to establish
a CI center in DIA.

Betty is setting up
meeting with [redacted]

[redacted] + me you
requested.

Rg.

Mutiny — 1000-1100
23 July

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19 July 1984

DCI STATEMENT

I propose that we enhance the existing CIA Foreign Intelligence Capabilities Group (FICG) as an alternative to the SSCI's proposal to establish an interagency Center for Counter-intelligence Analysis in the Defense Intelligence Agency. [REDACTED]

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Two years ago I established the FICG in CIA's Intelligence Directorate. My early objective was to create an analytical capability on the positive intelligence side of the house to address hostile intelligence services on an all-source basis, with emphasis on the Soviet Bloc and selected other countries, like Cuba. Prior to FICG's establishment, CIA's work in this field was narrowly focused. The thrust of the Group's efforts has been to examine the Soviet intelligence process, including KGB requirements and collection priorities, their methods and capabilities for data exploitation and analysis, their impact on policymakers, as well as their substantial efforts in intelligence denial and deception. [REDACTED]

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All of these efforts by FICG have been conducted by only a handful of analysts. I have authorized and encouraged Bob Gates to increase the group's strength [REDACTED] as soon as possible. Thus far, Bob has encouraged the selection of analysts who are long on analytical experience and have extensive knowledge of Soviet affairs. But, the Group's capabilities could be enhanced further by adding senior production oriented officers from other organizations. [REDACTED]

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Current production plans for FICG include participation in [redacted] research papers on Soviet intelligence analysis and the intelligence process aspects of the KGB [redacted] as well as serving as the Agency's focal point for the Community's annual hostile threat assessment. Later this summer FICG will host an interagency conference on Soviet deception, which will include participants from within and outside the government. With an enhanced FICG, bringing together the expertise from several organizations, greater strides could be made in producing positive intelligence on Soviet intelligence, and deception and denial activities. A multidisciplinary group could examine several priority topics, including the following:

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- Deception case studies (strategic military/political/economic).
- Soviet intelligence denial activities targeted against specific US collection programs.

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- Intelligence threat by Soviet Bloc commercial aircraft.
- Soviet exploitation and use of data acquired by satellite systems.

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- Intelligence compromise assessments.
- Soviet Active Measures, including agents-of-influence and trends in forgery use.

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An interagency group also would help to ensure that all sensitive information developed by collection organizations is brought to bear on the problem. While FICG already has access to some of the community's most sensitive information, such an enhancement would reduce the time required for, and increase the quality of, exploitation. [REDACTED]

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I know that this proposal runs counter to the SSCI's recommendation to establish a similar group in DIA's Office of Security. But, I believe we can establish the desired interagency analysis and production capability much more rapidly by enhancing an effort that is already underway. And, I believe positive intelligence is a more logical place for such an effort rather than within the security or counterintelligence parts of the community. [REDACTED]

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I would continue to maintain cognizance over the group, keeping them under the supervision of Bob Gates. This continued alliance with the production and positive intelligence side of the business assures a broader perspective on the issues and the use of existing production support organizations. And, it would facilitate continued communication with similar units in other agencies. As you know, last January, I established the position of NIO for Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities to provide general oversight for the community's efforts on the topic. And recently, I established in response to [REDACTED] an interagency mechanism, the Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, to provide a forum for sharing information and analysis. This committee is under the auspices of the NIO and includes representatives from DIA, State, NSA, and CIA; the CIA member is the Chief of FICG. I view this proposed enhancement of the Foreign Intelligence Capabilities Group as a logical companion effort to these interagency activities, one designed to increase and improve the community's analytical capabilities against foreign intelligence. [REDACTED]

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